Panel of High-Level Advisors on nuclear safety in Central and Eastern Europe and in the New Independent States.
A strategic view for the future of the European Union's Phare and Tacis Programmes by unknown
Foreword- Nuclear Safety in CEC & NIS- Strategic View- Phare. & Tacis  http:/  /europa.eu.in~comm/dg  1  a!nss/index.htm 
oft 
Executive Summary 
Main Report 
1.  Introduction 
2.  The Panel's Views 
and Comments on 
the Current 
Situation 
3.  The Panel's 
Recommendations 
for the Future 
4.  Conclusion 
.. 
w 
w 
0 
©CoPYright 
A3~30 
'  ..  .  .. 
•  "''  ···r  IWI'ftl  ro _[  r7.y_=po:;-;;'A=TE~D  i I  SIT£ MAL! iliOOll  CONTACTS 
Panel of High-Level Advisors on 
Nuclear Safety in Central and Eastern Europe and in the New 
Independent States 
A Strategic View for the Future of. the European Union•s Phare and 
Tacis Programmes 
Foreword 
Nuclear safety has  been  a priority in  the  European  Union's assistance programmes, Phare 
and Tacis. From 1991  until 1997, budget commitments of 780 MECU have been allocated to 
the nuclear safety parts of the two programmes. 
On the basis of experience gained, the European Commission has concluded that there is a 
further  need  to  reflect  on  programme  implementation  and  on  modalities  for  future 
cooperation based on  the priorities stemming from  the accession process for the Applicant 
countries and  the Partnership and  Co-operation  agreements between the  European  Union 
and each of the New Independent States. 
It  is  against  this  background  that  a  group  of independent  high  level  experts  has  been 
constituted  at the  beginning  of this  year and  entrusted with  the task to  give advise on  the 
nuclear safety policies to  be  applied  through the Phare and Tacis programmes. The group 
included  6  experts  with  a  variety  of expertise  and  was  chaired  by  Jean-Pierre  Contzen, 
former Director General of the Joint Research Centre. 
The attached  report reflects the opinion  of the team  of experts and  it does not necessarily 
reflect the  views  of the  European  Commission.  It  is  a valuable input to  the  Commission's 
work in  the area.  The  Commission will  examine the recommendations and  will  in  particular 
assess  to  what  extent  they  can  be  included  in  its  future  actions  in  this  field. 
Hans van den Broek 
Member of the European Commission 
I 
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Panel of High-Level Advisors on 
Nuclear Safety in Central and Eastern Europe and in the New 
Independent States 
A Strategic View for the Future of  the European Union's Phare and 
Tacis Programmes 
Executive Summary 
Since the decisions of the London and Munich G7 summits, the situation of nuclear safety in 
the East has evolved in the right direction; such decisions have provided the basis for 
defining the objectives of the nuclear components of the PHARE and TACIS programmes. 
This positive evolution, combined with a new geopolitical situation, notably the process of 
accession to the European Union of Central and Eastern European Countries, has led to the 
necessity of redefining the objectives of future EU actions in the field. 
Taking stock of the current situation, the Panel has noted that progress has been achieved in 
reaching the goal of improving the safety level of Nuclear Power Plants, this level depending 
on both the motivation and the resources of the country. Safety culture is no longer unknown 
in the East. It has also noted that nuclear energy is and will remain a substantial component 
of the energy policy of those countries already using it. 
In most Applicant Countries, the safety of nuclear power plants has been reinforced through 
upgrading and modernisation programmes, and the strengthening of their nuclear regulatory 
authorities. The panel does not foresee major difficulties for Applicant Countries in reaching, 
at the time of Accession, a level of nuclear safety comparable to that of current EU Member 
States; to ensure the fulfilment of this goal, a more precise definition of the level of nuclear 
safety to be reached needs to be formulated. 
Problems in three countries require, nevertheless, special attention at this stage :they relate 
to the early closure of Kozloduy units 1 and 2 in Bulgaria, of Bohunice V1  units in Slovakia 
and of lgnalina Unit 1 in Lithuania. 
In the New Independent States, the nuclear safety situation has also improved but more 
slowly and with more contrasted results. 
Ukraine should remain a priority with the requirement for fast international action on the 
Chernobyl Shelter and for political pressure from the international Community directed 
towards the closure of Chernobyl Unit 3 as soon as possible. Loans granted for the 
completion of Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 should enhance this process. 
Russia has taken a very independent stance on the issue of safety at its own nuclear power 
plants and in order to obtain maximum efficiency in the EU support, future actions in the field 
of reactor safety in Russia should be part of an overall scheme to be discussed a priori with 
Russian authorities. Furthermore, a new emphasis should be given to issues other than 
reactor safety such as fuel cycle and radioactive waste management, and safeguards. The 
Panel strongly believes that in spite of past difficulties in the dialogue with Russia, support 
should be maintained; it should be based on focused programmes, cooperation rather than 
assistance and reinforcement of the safety culture of all actors. 
Armenia and Kazakhstan do not pose problems of the same magnitude but their 
requirements for support are real and deserve EU action. 
In all countries, Applicant Countries and New Independent States, the Panel considers that a 
rigid application of conditionality does not necessarily serve the ultimate goal of safer nuclear 
activities in the East. Political judgement should be exercised before attempting to claim 
blindly the enforcement of such conditionality. 
Other general recommendations relate to : 
•  The need to move away from unilateral assistance to effective co-operation and 
partnership, with a much greater involvement, at all stages of the process, by the 
beneficiaries of the EU support; this is an integral part of the strategy for the eventual 
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return to self help. Assistance programmes cannot continue indefinitely. 
•  The desirability for extending the scope of the EU action beyond nuclear power plant 
safety not only in Russia but in all countries i.e. to the safety of the fuel cycle, 
radioactive waste management site decontamination, safeguards, safety of research 
reactors . 
•  The opportunity for promoting collaborative R&D between East and West; R&D could 
be a cornerstone of future contacts with Eastern countries, enlarging the cooperation 
upstream of technical and industrial support. 
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Panel of High  .. Level Advisors on 
Nuclear Safety in Central and Eastern Europe and in the New 
Independent States 
A Strategic View for the Future of the European Union•s Phare and 
Tacis Programmes 
Main Report 
Introduction 
Nuclear safety is of primary importance when considered within the context of European 
Union enlargement: the Agenda 2000 emphasises that nuclear safety is a priority. In 
addition, political and public concern is being voiced as to the safety levels of nuclear 
activities conducted within the New Independent States. The response of the European 
Commission to both these aspects must be commensurate with the challenges which they 
pose, and this response must be recognised more readily at a public level. 
TACIS and PHARE were established along with other EU programmes as support 
mechanisms through which nuclear safety aspects could be identified and addressed 
satisfactorily. This was part of the response of the EU to the G7 recommendations following 
the London and Munich Summits in  1991  and in  1992. As will be discussed later in this 
document, these programmes have clearly contributed to the improvement of nuclear safety 
in the East despite the considerable delay in achieving satisfactory results in this difficult 
area. Evolution of the geopolitical, economic, environmental and technical situations as well 
as the requirement for management improvements justifies a review of these programmes 
and the elaboration of a strategy for future actions and their subsequent implementation. To 
this end, a panel of high-level advisors was convened to advise Commissioner H. van den 
Broek on the orientation and implementation of EU support activities for the coming years 
related to nuclear safety in the Applicant Countries and in the NIS. The terms of reference of 
the Panel are presented in Annex 1 of this document, and its members have been selected 
due to their individual expertise in the areas identified by those terms: their details and 
affiliations are listed in Annex 2. 
As part of its investigations, the Panel has sought and obtained detailed information 
regarding the current situation of nuclear safety and related issues through a comprehensive 
series of interviews with senior representatives from the services of the Commission and 
relevant bodies from within the European Union. In addition, visits have been conducted to 
ministries, official bodies and industries in the Applicant Countries as well as in Russia and 
the Ukraine. A list of those interviewed during these visits is given in Annex 3. 
The Panel would like to take this opportunity to extend its sincere thanks to all those 
representatives, and also to the European Commission Delegations who facilitated the Panel 
visits to the Applicant Countries and the New Independent States so efficiently. 
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Main Report 
2 -The Panel's Views and Comments on the Current Situation 
2.1. - General Considerations 
2.1.1  The current state of Nuclear Reactor Safety in the East 
The strategic objectives of the West (G7) for improving nuclear safety in the East 
were established at the outset for the nuclear parts of both the TACIS and 
PHARE programmes which were focused accordingly almost exclusively on 
reactor safety issues. The Panel feels that the programmes have made useful 
contributions to the improvement in the safety of Eastern Reactors and have 
provided much needed technology and safety culture transfer. It has allowed 
Eastern and Western experts to become familiar with their respective 
technologies and operating procedures, providing much needed understanding 
for the to establishment of credible working relations. However, these 
programmes have not been as effective as they could have been, and significant 
procedural and management problems have lead beneficiaries to move away 
from TACIS and PHARE reducing the impact of these EU programmes. These 
limitations are discussed in detail below, and recommendations are made for the 
future. 
The 1992 Munich summit focused on reactor issues and called for the early 
closure of the units of WER and RBMK designs. So far, no Eastern country has 
implemented plant closures, some six years after the beginning of the 
programmes but safety improvements have been undertaken. In the intervening 
years, a great deal more has been learned about the Russian designs, and in 
some countries, significant investments have shown what can be done by way of 
safety improvement even for the older plants. In principle all of the countries 
have their own reactor safety upgrading programmes for their particular reactor 
types. This recent experience has lead the Panel to the following key elements 
concerning these reactors which we believe should form the basis of a future 
strategy. 
These items also underpin the costed scenario given in section 3.3, and the 
specific strategic recommendations by country given in section 2.2. 
•  The Treatment of Older Plant : The oldest WER 440/230 and the first 
generation of RBMK designs: 
These reactors have safety deficiencies primarily concerning their ability to cope 
with accidents which are normally safeguarded against in Western designs. Back 
fitting of necessary safety systems is impractical. As long as only normal 
operational transients/upsets are encountered, these reactors, with the safety 
improvements now known to be possible and economic, can be operated for a 
short time without excessive risk (the "time at risk" argument). However, life 
extension, or even extended operation, is highly undesirable and the Panel is 
clear that TACIS and PHARE funds should not be used to allow extended 
operation, nor, in any circumstances, life extension. 
•  The Later WER type Reactors {213 and 1000 designs) 
The Panel believes that pressurised water reactors of these later designs can be 
upgraded, by means of improved instrumentation and control, maintenance, 
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testing, operational safety improvements and the inclusion of mitigative features, 
enough to justify their continued operation up to the specified lifetime. 
•  The later RBMK type reactors 
The Panel differentiates the second and third generations of RBMK reactors from 
the earliest, first generation, because of their designed capability to deal with 
some kinds of severe (i.e. fuel melting) accidents. The Panel recognises that the 
channel type reactor is fundamentally different from the more familiar (in the 
West) pressurised water reactor. In this, the requirements for containment 
function are different and provisions in later RBMK designs are adequate for the 
design basis fuel melting accidents. 
If these reactors are continuously updated and well maintained, they could be 
treated, in terms of their capacity to cope with design base accident, in the same 
way as the later designs of WER reactors as detailed above. However, we must 
point out that apart from the special cases of Lithuania and Ukraine (Chernobyl), 
all of the RBMK reactors of this type are in Russia and hence the future strategy 
should focus on the difficulties and needs of this country. In particular, a coherent 
safety improvement programme within Russia is a fundamental requirement for 
any extensive future safety improvement strategy. Experience would indicate 
that such a programme is not going to be easily achieved. 
The special cases of Ukraine and Lithuania are treated in section 2.2.2 and 
2.2.9. 
•  Reactors of  Western Origin 
Two nuclear installations in the East use reactors of Western origin. In Slovenia, 
it is a US built PWR. The situation in this country is discussed in more detail 
below, but the Panel believes that this is reactor is maintained, operated and 
regulated very much to Western standards. Whilst continued vigilance is, of 
course necessary, the panel is not aware of any safety issue which would justify 
EU action. In Romania, they operate a Canadian designed CANDU reactor and 
here there are significant potential problems associated with the proliferation of 
nuclear materials. These are discussed in the section 2.2.1 0. 
2.1.2 The Economics of Nuclear Power in the East. 
•  Energy options 
When evaluating the overall economics of a component of the energy (or other) 
sector, the analysis should involve a full accounting of the costs and benefits to 
Society of the choices in question. Thus, an evaluation of the total costs of 
nuclear power or e.g. coal power would distinguish the private costs of fuel 
labour, capital etc., and the external costs in terms of potential damage to health, 
ecosystems and life support processes, addressed to the full fuel cycle from 
mining to waste disposal, and in the case of nuclear, proliferation and 
safeguards. However, such an evaluation is beyond the scope of this report. 
Here we just want to present the energy policy environment as it was presented 
to us in the countries visited as a background to our strategy analysis. 
In all countries visited, the Panel encountered a very strong commitment to 
maintain and in some cases to expand the nuclear sector. This enthusiasm 
derives from a variety of factors, which are outlined below, including the relative 
unattractiveness of the available options, and the fact that some of the potential 
costs would not be borne In shaping policy, it is important too understand the 
logic which is driving the support for nuclear within the Applicant and NIS 
countries which have nuclear capacity. Thus, we make no implications as to the 
overall economic costs and benefits of the sector. 
In all of the countries involved in this review, nuclear power is a low-cost energy 
source and for them it is clearly cheaper than any foreseeable alternative. The 
operating costs, including an allowance for decommissioning, are low, at about 
the same level as in Sweden or Finland. They might be even lower if there were 
an international market for WER fuel. Low salaries and more general social cost 
considerations generally compensate for the still high, but decreasing, staffing 
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levels of plant. Even the figures, which the Panel has studied for investment 
costs indicate that new nuclear is also cheaper than any alternative. 
Hydro-power may be a competitive alternative, but in most cases only as a 
load-topping capacity since non-exploited hydro resources are limited and in any 
case are generally of small unit size and hence relatively high cost. 
On the conventional thermal side, low-productivity mining sectors in combination 
with extremely low quality coal or lignite make solid fuels, and hence energy 
production derived therefrom, expensive, even without the additional costs of flue 
gas desulphurisation (FGD). Thus, additional internal investments in FGD are 
difficult to justify. Consequently a large share of the conventional thermal 
capacity is obsolete or close to it. This is especially true in the relatively large 
Ukraine. However, there is a case for maintaining a certain share of fossil fuel 
capacity in order to retain a strategic energy balance. In reality, the slow 
restructuring of the inefficient and overstaffed mining sectors is probably the 
main reason for keeping much of the coal fired capacity alive. 
In the future, combined cycle gas fired units will claim an increasing market 
share, especially for co-generation in urban areas and in heavy industry as that 
recovers. The uncertainty in natural gas pricing make predictions and 
assessments of future generating cost uncertain. The Panel is of the view that 
the cost level will be similar too, or somewhat cheaper than coal fired plant 
based on clean coal technologies. 
•  Opposition to closure of Nuclear Power Plants 
In all countries visited, we have found a strong opposition against closure of 
nuclear units. 
Several reasons were put forward for this. 
•  A nuclear power unit represents an important capital asset also in the 
Western economies, even more so in poorer applicant countries and the 
NIS. Thus, the closure of a unit or some units with several years of 
remaining life-time is not a trivial economic sacrifice for a poor country but 
represents a substantial capital loss. 
•  If increased import of fuel or direct electricity is necessary after a closure, a 
term of trade effect will arise. This effect may be serious in the 
East-European context since most countries have severe current account 
deficits. 
•  A closure will increase the domestic price of electricity worsening the 
competitive situation of the domestic heavy industry and make it even more 
difficult to restructure and privatise large electricity using enterprises  . 
•  In the case of a more extensive closure of several units, macroeconomic 
effects will also arise. Wages and salaries have to adjust downwards and 
with sticky nominal wages, there will be an inflationary pressure on the 
economy  . 
•  A closure will increase the (discounted) costs of nuclear power by bringing 
the costs of decommissioning closer to the present. All applicant countries 
have initiated a levy scheme to generate ring-fenced funds to finance 
decommissioning and associated costs. However, without extending the 
productive life of the units, sufficient funds will not have accumulated to 
finance decommissioning. 
•  A closure may also require strengthening of parts of the national 
transmission grid caused by increased electricity import or other locations 
of new generating plants  . 
•  Meeting limitations on greenhouse gas emissions according to the Kyoto 
Convention on Climate Change may have a major impact on the cost of a 
closure, since alternative options may be much more costly. This may be 
less relevant for the NIS, where emissions are far below 1990-levels and 
economic growth slow, but more relevant for the applicant countries, which 
have agreed to reduce emissions of six greenhouse gases by 8 % by 
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2008-2012, while Russia and the NIS agreed to stabilise their emissions, 
using 1990 as base. Slovenia already in  1995 exceeded the 1990 C02 
emission level by 8 %, while Poland was close to the 1990 level. With slow 
economic growth, however, most applicant countries are likely to meet their 
targets by a significant margin but if economic growth takes off at 2-3% per 
year, most of them would probably have to undertake actions not to exceed 
their emissions target. In this time perspective there will be a real cost 
involved to them in replacing nuclear power with carbon producing sources. 
Set against the costs of closure are the potential benefits. If the unit(s) in 
question are at risk of having an accident, closure will reduce risk of damage to 
health, to ecosystems and life support systems generally. And there are the 
future costs of decommissioning which may not be fully internalised in the price 
of electricity. The benefits of closure are probabilistic and in the future and in 
some cases cross-frontiers, while the costs of closure are borne within their own 
borders with certitude today. Here are the rationale for international assistance. 
All these aspects explain, at least in part, why countries try to avoid closure and 
in the light of these considerations it is perhaps not surprising that the Panel 
found strong political support for nuclear power in these countries. 
•  Market reform 
The applicant countries are all in different phases of electricity market 
restructuring and privatisation of electricity generation and distribution. This 
raises a concern for the ownership and organisation of nuclear power plant. So 
far, the view is that nuclear power will remain in the public sector for the 
foreseeable future. If this were to change, the onus on strong and independent 
regulators would then become much stronger. 
Another aspect of electricity market reform is the EU minimum requirement for 
Third Party Access (TPA). The main impact of this is a much closer integration of 
previously isolated electricity, markets and the inevitable increase in import and 
export of electricity. The benefits for nuclear power of increased international 
integration are large, especially in those countries with a large share of nuclear 
generation. This includes, for example, Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak 
Republics. In such countries increased international integration would provide a 
substitute for back-up power as reserve capacity to nuclear power, especially in 
the case of sudden outages. Thus, upgrading international links may be an 
economically viable substitute for costly hydro reservoirs, pump storage plant 
and gas turbines. The import of electricity for short periods, perhaps with 
economic assistance (see section 3.3) could facilitate, or even make possible 
more time consuming upgrading and performance improvements of some 
nuclear units. 
•  Future electricity demand 
This important question is discussed in detail in Annex 4. 
Future development of all forms of energy and in particular nuclear energy is 
linked to the evolution of electricity demand in the applicant countries and in the 
New Independent States; this has been an element of debate and controversy in 
a recent past, in relation to the issue of closure of older plants. The panel 
believes that future electricity demand in the East will mainly be driven by the 
economic growth process; this means that future electricity demand should grow 
at about at the same rate as the general economic growth in the East; it also 
means that the large uncertainty about future economic growth translates into an 
equally large uncertainty about future demand for electricity. 
•  Funding issues 
The implications of the condition of public sector financing and deficits in virtually 
all of the countries are important for our work since this implies severe difficulties 
in expanding public expenditure. This has been exacerbated by the IMF's very 
active role in these countries in supporting the very necessary macroeconomic 
stabilisation process by imposing very demanding constraints on public 
expenditure. On the other hand, at least in the Applicant countries, the Utilities 
are able to finance their own investments (even in Bulgaria) for safety and 
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performance improvements. Thus, the need for direct financial support from the 
EU for reactor improvement projects is rather limited. This has influenced our 
thinking to the point that we believe that the most important area for the future 
lies in support of those parts of the infrastructure which are publicly funded and 
play an importune part in guaranteeing all aspects of nuclear safety. We shall 
see again later that this is one of our reasons for foreseeing the need to shift 
emphasis into support of environmental issues, particularly the clean up of 
uranium mining activities and the development of much stronger environmental 
ministries and agencies, the improvement of the safeguards capabilities, the care 
of research reactors, the safe operation of radiation therapy centres and a 
general need to support nuclear safety research activities. This is, of course in 
addition to the most obviously important aspect of publicly funded activities, that 
of the regulatory bodies themselves. These new directions will described as 
appropriate in the discussions to come. 
2.1 .3 The magnitude of the financial effort to upgrade nuclear safety in the East 
Detailed cost estimates of the amount required to bring all nuclear installations in 
the East to a safety level equivalent to Western practices are not available and 
would require considerable efforts for their evaluation. 
Nevertheless, in order to give a rough indication of the magnitude of the effort, 
the Panel has conducted the following reasoning: limiting itself to nuclear power 
plant safety, the Panel has compiled the following figures: 
•  safety upgrading of a WER 440/213 unit: 75 to 200 MECU 
•  safety upgrading of a WER 1  000/320 unit : 100 to 150 MECU 
•  safety upgrading of a RBMK unit: 100 to 150 MECU 
(the large spread in estimates is due in part to assumptions about the 
contribution of Western Countries to such upgrading) 
In the NIS, there are 4 WER 213, 18 WER 1000 and 12 RBMK reactors; if all 
were upgraded, this leads to a cost of 3.3 to 4.3 BECU. In the Applicant 
countries, there are 12 WER 213 and 4 WER 1000 reactors; these upgradings 
are assessed to be about 2 BECU. 
Even considering that the financial efforts for Applicant Countries would be borne 
by the countries themselves (which is a significant effort indicating a positive 
trend in safety culture), the amount for the N  IS remains so large that it exceeds 
by far the effort which the European Union could afford. 
Costs for support to adequate spent fuel storage, radioactive waste 
management, decontamination and decommissioning are not included in these 
rough estimates but could easily correspond to an additional Billion ECU or 
more. 
In the N  IS, the size of the investment required and the extended time scale over 
which improvements must be maintained means thus that the only realistic 
strategy for EU support is to ensure progress to self help and a well focused, 
independent regulatory authority and to contribute to environmental restoration. 
Progress towards these goals should underpin the EU's forward strategy. 
2.1.4 The particular issue of conditionality 
The Panel has come to the conclusion, after many detailed discussions with both 
potential beneficiary countries and various interested parties from the EU that a 
rigid requirement for conditionality, and especially plant closure agreements does 
not contribute to the principal objectives of the programme, i.e. improving nuclear 
safety. Since this has been a rather basic principal in previous years, some 
words of explanation are appropriate. Our rationale is based on the following: 
•  For many countries, the amount of money made available by the West is 
small compared to that needed to reach Western Standards. The leverage 
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available is therefore small, and tough conditions are unlikely to be 
acceptable or implemented . 
•  Safety requirements and the approval for operations must remain with the 
local regulator. Any "conditions" must be consistent with their own 
requirements and not based on our perceived needs; in this regard, a 
strong local regulator is a key requirement. 
•  Some countries remain convinced that their reactors are safe enough and 
will accept with difficulty a technical argument to the contrary. The dialogue 
should be pursued nevertheless, with a view to bridge gaps and maintain, 
in spite of differences, the common objective of nuclear safety 
enhancement. 
•  Experience shows that even apparently technically soundly based 
conditions can become difficult to achieve, as technical knowledge or 
capability evolves. 
•  The programme procedures have meant that some countries with well 
developed technologies have been treated in a patronising way; adding 
conditions to assistance only serves to heighten these sensitivities. 
•  The slowness and lack of sensitivity of programme management means 
that many countries do not consider T  ACIS/PHARE grants for immediate, 
and therefore important, safety upgrades. Since this funding stream is 
considered as a welcome addition and not a vital element, the imposing of 
onerous conditions is that much more difficult. 
Having made this case for the softening of conditionality, we wish to emphasise 
that softer conditions does not mean that there is no need for a strategy. Indeed, 
it makes it all the more important that there be an overall vision and purpose to 
the programme if individual projects are not to be subject to rigid conditions. This 
theme is returned to in many places in this report, and, of course in our main 
recommendations. 
The Panel believes that the way to ensure that the future operation of all the 
plant in these countries is as safe as possible is to work through and with the 
regulatory authorities who have the necessary legal and sovereign powers. This 
imperative applies to all countries and hence a general reinforcement is required. 
There are significant variations in the scale of the need. Having said that, it is 
also important to work with the Utilities to ensure that they share the 
development in safety culture, where motivation of staff is a key issue. This 
improvement has already been seen in some of the countries, but again there 
are some significant variations which we highlight later. It is clearly important to 
maintain and to strengthen links already established with Eastern regulators and 
Utilities. 
Associated with the conditionality issue is the treatment of the beneficiaries. This 
is discussed in more detail under management issues below, but our basic 
finding is that there should be a deliberate shift in terminology from beneficiary to 
collaborator or partner. For the majority of the countries involved, we are dealing 
with experienced and well trained engineers who are well aware of the technical 
issues and the needs for their resolution. 
Finally, any future programme must be realistic; it must not raise expectations on 
either side in excess of the funding available and needed. 
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Panel of High-Level Advisors on 
Nuclear Safety in Central and Eastern Europe and in the New 
Independent States 
A Strategic View for the Future of the European Union's Phare and 
Tacis Programmes 
Main Report 
2 -The Panel's Views and Comments on the Current Situation 
2.2. - A detailed Appraisal of the Position in the Various Countries 
General 
The general aspects of nuclear reactor safety which the Panel believes should 
be addressed have been outlined above. However, as we have said, there are 
significant differences from country to country and these call for the more 
detailed analysis which we present in this section. Therefore, here we specify the 
Panel's views of the key strategic issues on a country by country basis. Because 
of the major differences between the countries of the NIS and the Applicant 
Countries, we make an initial classification along these lines. 
New Independent States (Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan) 
The analysis is concentrated on 4 countries, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and 
Kazakhstan in view of the presence of Nuclear Power Plants in these countries. 
Other N  IS countries may have specific problems related to nuclear activities, for 
example the recent difficulties over the security of the research reactor in 
Georgia. However, the Panel has not made any attempt up to now to investigate 
such additional problems, which should, in any case, be of a lesser priority then 
those encountered in the four NIS analysed in the report. 
Applicant Countries 
Poland, Latvia and Estonia do not operate nuclear plant and there appear to be 
no current significant problems related to nuclear safety in Poland and Latvia, 
there is a potential problem in  Estonia concerning the clean up of Uranium mine 
activities at Sillamae. For the others countries {Bulgaria - The Czech Republic -~ 
- Lithuania - Romania-~- Slovenia), there are Nuclear Power operations and so 
each country is treated individually following the discussion of some generic 
issues. 
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Panel of High-Level Advisors on 
Nuclear Safety in Central and Eastern Europe and in the New 
Independent States 
A Strategic View for the Future of  the European Union's Phare and 
Tacis Programmes 
Main Report 
2 • The Panel's Views and Comments on the Current Situation 
2.2. - A detailed Appraisal of the Position in the Various Countries 
1. Russia 
Russia represents the largest and most complex country of the NIS. As the 
primary source of all the reactor technology, and the Institutions responsible for 
it, it continues to play a pivotal role. Even the crudest cost estimates (see section 
2.1.3) show that even the total Western assistance cannot make a significant 
contribution to the investment needed to upgrade all of the currently operating 
plant, even supposing that the Russian Authorities would accept such a large 
contribution, with its associated political dimension. Hence the requirement for a 
clear strategy for nuclear reactor safety in Russia, based on mutual respect and 
seeking to maximise mutual benefits. 
The forward strategy has to be based on focused programmes, co-operation 
rather than assistance and especially towards the development of a satisfactory 
safety culture for designers, operators and regulators. The key strategic 
requirement is for a transparent, coherent and agreed plan for safety 
improvements in all sectors of the nuclear industry. 
This has not been achieved in the past; the EU support programme in the area of 
reactor safety has most probably been welcomed at local, nuclear power plant 
level but does not enjoy much appreciation at higher level (ROSENERGOATOM 
and MINATOM). The Panel suggests therefore to revise the EU approach 
limiting the actions in the area of reactor safety somewhat below the initial 
ambitions but at a level sufficient for continuing collaboration and maintaining the 
dialogue. 
The revised approach is based on the condition that the high level decision 
makers, primarily in MINATOM, can be persuaded to participate in the 
elaboration of the fundamental plan referred to here above. The new ministerial 
team at MINATOM needs to be convinced about this approach which is essential 
if the EU wishes to maintain its support programme. 
In the new approach, conditionality will have to be treated with great care; the 
recent case of the restart of Kursk 1, ignoring the conditionality clause of the 
NSA grant to Russia, shows how difficult it is to have it implemented. 
Continuing collaboration should be based on the following principles: 
For reactor safety : 
a.  The concept of the evolution towards co-operation rather than assistance 
should underpin all future projects in design safety, on site assistance and 
strengthening the regulatory bodies. 
b.  Generic safety issues (design, operation and maintenance) should be given 
priority over single plant issues. However, it is vital that when generic safety 
work is done, its results are made available to all parties in Russia, other 
Eastern countries operating the same type of reactors and to relevant 
parties in the West. 
c.  On site assistance considered to have been one of the most successful of 
the assistance programmes. However, the need for this kind of assistance 
1 
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has diminished as the programme has achieved much of its original intent. 
In future, OSA could be reduced to a Regional presence, with attendance 
on-site on an as needed basis. 
d.  Fewer, larger scale projects are preferred, but again some resistance from 
the country is anticipated because of the implications for a more strategic 
approach commonly agreed a priori. 
e.  Future projects/contracts should be planned and implemented with much 
closer involvement of the beneficiary countries. In Russia, the Joint 
Management Unit (JMU) may offer the right vehicle for taking this forward. 
For Fuel Cycle Management : 
As discussed in section 3.1, the Panel believes that Russia should be the 
proving ground for a major international undertaking on the stabilisation and 
relocation of highly active material, arising primarily from spent fuel reprocessing 
and nuclear submarine fuel. The problem exists in many places, but is 
particularly severe in its North West region in relation to submarine fuel. 
There is increasing international attention and concern now being generated by 
this issue and the Panel believes that the EU should take a significant initiative in 
providing technical assistance to resolving a threat which is close to its own back 
door. 
As with the reactor issues, the scale of the problem is very large and therefore 
the use of available resources from the EU has to be focused in those areas 
which are most critical and where maximum leverage can be obtained. The 
expectations of a project focussed on N.W Russia must be realistic and 
consistent with its size. It is clear that such a project must be conducted with 
other donor countries, especially the Nordic states (the Baltic Alliance) and the 
USA and must be the result of comprehensive discussions and agreement with 
the relevant Russian authorities. This is a particularly sensitive area and an 
appropriate balance must be struck between the donor objectives and the 
beneficiaries requirements and national interests. The EU should play a leading 
role in the implementation of this project and ensure that its contribution is visible 
and recognised. 
The justifiable focus on North West Russia does not mean that the situation 
elsewhere, especially east of the Urals should be ignored. The Panel believes 
that the economic and environmental issues of the fuel cycle/waste disposal 
issues have to be seen in their entirety, and therefore recommends that a 
European programme of assistance focusing on safety of the tertiary phase of 
the fuel cycle (storage/disposal) should also be undertaken. The Panel 
recommends a programme to support the improvement and security of 
radioactive waste handling facilities East of the Urals mountains as part of this 
holistic approach. In both uses- N.W. Russia and East of the Urals- it is 
imperative that clear concepts should be delineated before more practical work 
be undertaken. 
Safeguards : 
Support in the field of safeguards should have Russia as its priority in view of the 
large amount of fissile material in this country. The adequate control of nuclear 
materials remains a key non-proliferation issue at world level. The Panel 
recommends that the principle of collaboration, which is already well entrenched, 
and a transition to self help is applied, with priority going to training (for the 
trainers), the development of an industrial platform in Russia for the production of 
instrumentation based on indigenous Russian technology, transfer of 
methodologies and standards for reinforcing nuclear material control and 
accountancy practices. 
1) 
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The tertiary phase of the fuel cycle project mentioned previously requires a 
supporting project in safeguards and the panel recommends support for a new 
methodological and training centre to be installed East of the Urals . 
Research Reactors: 
There are a large number of research reactors in Russia. Many of them are 
obsolete and located in urban areas. Because they are owned primarily by 
research organisations with little money available, there is a need to help support 
their stabilisation and first steps to decommissioning. The Russian regulator in 
particular has drawn this problem to our attention. 
* * 
In conclusion, because of the scale of the reactor safety issue, the wide range of 
technical issues and Institutions involved, but primarily because of lower 
expectations about the active interest of Russian authorities for it, the Panel 
recommends a significant shift in priorities for Russia. In particular, we 
recommend a somewhat reduced on-going programme in the reactor safety 
area, focussing on the regulatory authority and with sufficient support to utilities 
and industry to improve design safety wherever possible; this would at least 
provide for continuing dialogue and the maintenance of communications between 
the Eastern and Western specialists, from both the Regulatory bodies and the 
Utilities. The new focus should be on radioactive waste and spent fuel 
management, specifically the North West Russia problem and the associated 
environmental recuperation, as well as the development of suitable disposal sites 
east of the Urals. 
A second main area should be that of nuclear materials safeguards. 
Furthermore, we see collaboration in R&D as a particularly useful tool at the 
present time for maintaining the dialogue and reinforcing links the general 
framework for Science and Technology co-operation between Russia and the EU 
can be used to reinforce this, notably with the anticipated commencement of the 
fifth Framework Programme. Multi-national mechanisms such as the 
International Science and Technology Centre could also contribute in this 
respect. 
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2. Ukraine 
Matters relevant to assistance programmes in the Ukraine are dominated by 
concerns surrounding the Chernobyl site, and knock on effects from it. Much of 
that is being considered in broader international fora, with the EU one of the 
players. The Panel believes that the central focus of EU support to the Ukraine 
should be the resolution of the Shelter issue. The Panel recommends the 
reinforcement of the EU's pro-active initiative in the definition of the Shelter 
Implementation Plan and in the setting up of the Chernobyl Shelter Fund, which 
has been beset by delays and wrangling to the point where some Ukrainian 
Authorities fear that much of the previous investment (in money and experts' 
time) is in real danger of being wasted. The real point at issue is that the 
accident debris, especially the remains of Unit 4 pose a real and immediate 
threat. It is not a probabilistic threat as is posed by the reactors. The Panel 
proposes an envelope for the EC contribution to the Shelter Fund in Section 3.3. 
We believe that it would be both realistic and highly beneficial to increase the 
funding during the period 2000 - 2004 beyond what the Commission has already 
pledged. 
The key reasons for such proposed increase are as follows : 
•  The need to remove an immediate threat to a very large number of people. 
•  The opportunity for the EU to fund a realistic, large engineering problem 
with very specific and measurable outputs. 
•  The nature of this particular project which should escape "conditionality" 
requirements which have always lead to severe difficulties in the past. 
•  Major reactor safety issues, such as the early completion of Khmelnitsky 
Unit 2 and Rovno Unit 4 are best left to the auspices of the NSA and other 
major funding schemes, such as Euratom loans. 
If the principal problem in the Ukraine is the Shelter and clean up of the site at 
Chernobyl, there also remains the difficult issue of the continued operation of 
Unit 3. At the time of the Panel's visit to the site, Unit 3 had just been returned to 
service after a very long outage to repair cracks in the main circuit pipe work. 
Considering that this reactor, albeit of the later type, has not received any safety 
upgrades (apart from the "standard" post Chernobyl accident changes), is being 
operated immediately adjacent to the Sarcophagus, which is generally held to be 
in very poor condition and that the working conditions on the site are far from 
ideal, continued operation at full power seems to us nothing short of reckless. 
However, it is, we hope a short term problem in that it appears to be part of a 
bargaining stance with the NSA over grant assistance to the country; it is not 
likely to be a long term issue requiring plant safety upgrades to underpin its 
operation for some years to come. We have, therefore, not included any 
recommendations for this Unit. Nevertheless, the Panel urges the Commission to 
take every opportunity to make it plain to the National Authorities that the 
continued operation of Unit 3 is seen as highly undesirable and a considerable 
threat to both the Ukrainian people and its international standing. Pressure from 
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the EU for an early resolution of the completion of Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 
would be of great benefit as this would remove one of the principal bargaining 
cards of the Ukrainian government. 
With regard to other Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants, on site assistance and 
contribution to Design Safety are important in view to their contribution to Design 
Safety improvements in those plants where the lack of own resources to perform 
such improvements is obvious. 
In the light of this, the Panels findings for the Ukraine may be summarised as 
•  The main focus of TACIS support for the next years should be a strong EU 
involvement in the International Shelter Project, including adequate 
industrial return. 
•  Strong support should be given to the Ukrainian regulatory authorities and 
to the Environmental and Emergency Response Ministries. In this country 
the problem of lack of resources for public services is acute, and this leads 
to very large pay differentials between regulator and plant staff. Whilst we 
recognise that it is not possible to directly pay the salaries of staff, we 
believe that additional assistance should be made available in the form of 
support to travel to EU countries for meetings and training, for closer 
communications with colleagues from the EU in Ukraine and, if necessary, 
hardware and software. 
•  Every opportunity should be taken to bring pressure to bear on the 
Ukrainian Authorities to close Chernobyl Unit 3 for good. Early resolution of 
the financing issue for the completion of Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 could 
help in this respect. 
•  Ukraine is keen on Site Assistance and contribution to Design Safety and 
so we believe that these types of support should be continued as long as 
they are welcome. 
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2-The Panel's Views and Comments on the Current Situation 
2.2.- A detailed Appraisal of the Position in the Various Countries 
3. Armenia 
The economic and social conditions in Armenia remain fragile. The Medzamor 
plant (VVER 440/230) is playing a central role in maintaining the growth in the 
economy, and providing a basis for stable political development. The continued 
operation of 
the plant for several more years pending the implementation of an overall energy 
strategy seems to be an inevitable pre-requisite for the future development of the 
country. The ongoing EU assistance should continue and should focus on short 
term improvements of design safety through on site projects, remediation of, key 
technical deficiencies (such as emergency preparedness and the means for 
extensive non-destructive testing) and support to the regulatory authority. The 
Panel notes that some bi-lateral assistance also comes from the USA and it is 
important to co-ordinate any future projects, especially in relation to the 
regulatory body. 
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2.2. - A detailed Appraisal of the Position in the Various Countries 
4. Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan has enormous problems in the form of site contamination and the 
location of potentially hazardous radioactive wastes. This country has had 
relatively little attention paid to its problems and what seems to be needed is an 
assessment of their true extent, followed by the development of an agreed 
comprehensive strategic plan. This could be part of preparation for possible later 
more specific, realistically sized, assistance programmes. 
Kazakhstan has recently announced plans to order 3 Russian WER Units of 640 
MWE, starting operation in 2005. The operation of such plant place new 
requirements on the Regulatory Authority and it would be worthwhile for the 
Commission to investigate the use of TACIS funds to support this Authority. 
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Applicant Countries 
Poland, Latvia and Estonia do not operate nuclear plant and there appear to be 
no current significant problems related to nuclear safety in Poland and Latvia, 
there is a potential problem in  Estonia concerning the clean up of Uranium mine 
activities at Sillamae. For the others countries, there are Nuclear Power 
operations and so each country is treated individually following the discussion of 
some generic issues. 
5. General 
The EU has placed a requirement on the Applicant countries to reach "Western 
Standards" by accession. Since there is no legal document defining European 
Nuclear Reactor Safety Standards, the guidelines against which the countries 
can judge their level are not clearly defined. One way forward which the Panel 
recommends, would be for the Applicant Countries to apply in their areas of 
jurisdiction the regulatory practices of any of the established nuclear operating 
Member States. It does not seem important which of the established regulatory 
schemes is adopted as long as it suits the needs of the applicant country; what is 
important is that the country adopts the chosen scheme in its integrality. 
If no understanding is reached on this issue, there is the real danger that 
applicant countries will fill the vacuum by adopting the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission approach. This would, in our view, be detrimental because this 
system is different in principal to those of EU countries in that it is prescriptive. 
This is because it was developed for a country operating more than a hundred 
reactors, owned by many different Utilities, and coming from different suppliers. 
The more usual interactive system adopted in Europe is much more suited to the 
needs of these small countries with relatively few plant, which are of very similar 
design. 
For many of these countries there exists a well developed nuclear research 
infrastructure. The Panel believes that additional resources and mechanisms 
should be put into place to ensure that the experience gained is both retained 
and made available through collaboration to EU Institutions. We understand that 
there will be 
possibilities for collaboration in the upcoming fifth Framework Programme and 
this is laudable; however, because we attach great importance to strong 
interactions between the research communities, we encourage even more efforts 
from the Commission to support this area. 
Taking nuclear safety in its widest possible meaning, the Panel have noted that 
the environmental aspects need to be strengthened as most of the institutional 
structures are not well developed in these countries. For the Applicant Countries, 
it is important that the environmental dimensions of the nuclear sector be 
addressed so as to conform with existing and emerging Union policies in this 
regard. Specifically, this requires that there be: 
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•  adequate information on environmental performance across the full nuclear 
cycle; most attention heretofore has been addressed to power plant 
operation 
•  access by the public to information on safety and emissions performance 
which meets modern standards of clarity, transparency and timeliness 
•  appropriate technical, administrative and managerial capacities in Ministries 
of the Environment, backed by relevant statutory and policy formulation and 
implementation structures. Resources in the Commission itself for dealing 
with such considerations are barely adequate to meet the needs in current 
Member States and would need to be reinforced. 
20 
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Applicant Countries 
6. Bulgaria 
Bulgaria relies currently on nuclear energy for about 45 % of its electricity 
production. In 2000, the planned distribution should be (figures in brackets are 
the objectives for 201 0). 
Local coal fired power plants  35%  (38%) 
Imported coal fired power plants  22%  (25%) 
Hydro power  5%  (5%) 
Nuclear power  38%  (32%) 
The importance of electricity production from local coal is notable and will 
probably have serious environmental consequences. 
The Panel noted that in spite of the precarious economic situation, significant 
improvements have been made in terms of plant nuclear safety and safety 
culture. This agrees with other international assessments, including a 
comparison with the situation in 1995 when a member of the Panel made a 
similar visit. 
The Panel was impressed by the expertise and experience of the Utilities 
Engineering Staff, but the Regulatory Authority did not give a strong impression. 
This body clearly needs further strengthening in terms of its independent status, 
its technical competence and its capacity to be ahead in thinking when dealing 
with a competent nuclear operator. 
So far as spent fuel is concerned, the country is in the privileged position of still 
being able to return it to Russia. The interim spent fuel storage facility at 
Kozloduy, which has been visited by the Panel, has adequate capacity and the 
IAEA safeguards are fully implemented. 
There is a serious problem concerning environmental contamination from 
previous uranium mining, and this is an area where assistance from the EU 
would be welcomed. 
In the field of nuclear power plant safety, the Panel noted the safety upgrading 
and modernisation programmes for both WER-440/230's (Units 1-4) and WER 
1OOO's (Units 5 and 6) 
The modernisation programme for Units 5 and 6 is ready for implementation with 
a European consortium involving Siemens, Framatome and Atomenergoexport 
(Russia) with another European consortium selected for consultancy on project 
management. The scale and focus of this programme is such that it should bring 
these Units to an adequate level of safety and availability. 
Units 1 to 4 have been subject to safety upgrading during the period 1991  to 
J\ 
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1997, which was described as a short term Programme. Following an in-depth 
safety assessment, a further "Complex Programme PRG' 97" is underway for the 
period 1998-2001 with a total investment of 95 M$ and a peak annual investment 
of 37M$ in  1999. 
The key issue is the date of closure of Units 1 and 2 in line with the conditionality 
of the Nuclear Safety Account Agreement. The Bulgarian Authorities wish to 
maintain the Units 1 to 4 in operation until the completion of the upgrading of 
Units 5 and 6. Also maintaining Units 1 to 4 in operation for several more years 
would allow the Bulgarian Authority to accumulate most of the money required 
subsequently for decommissioning the plant. This is being done by adding 0.5 
cents per kWh to the electricity price; this equalises electricity prices for thermal 
and hydro production, and provides a significant fund. 
The Panel recommends that; 
•  priority should be given to the earliest implementation of the upgrading 
programmes for Units 5 and 6.  Early allocation of the Euratom loan is an 
important factor in this respect. 
•  a firm assurance from the Bulgarian Government be obtained that Units 
1and 2 will be closed as soon as the upgrading programme for units 5 or 6 
is completed. This implies a closure of the Unit 1 and 2 before the end of 
the design lifetime, a prospect that Bulgarian authorities do not seem to 
reject. 
•  the operation of Units 3 and 4 sould be monitored very closely. Whilst these 
units are younger than Units 1 and 2, they are of the same early design and 
the continued operation of the plant up to, and possibly beyond 201 0, is 
questionable. The EU should continue to exercise pressure for as early a 
closure as possible; in the meantime, the implementation of short term 
improvements must be monitored as they are performed on an as needed 
basis. All this implies the need for a vigorous support to the regulatory 
authorities. An on-site presence would be beneficial both to assist the plant 
and to provide direct progress reports to the EU. 
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7. The Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic operates 4 WER 440/213 reactors at the Dukovany site. 
These represent approximately 22% of the electricity generating capacity of the 
country. Two WER 1000 reactors are under construction at Temelin. When 
these are brought 
into service, nuclear will represent about 40% of the installed capacity. There are 
presently no plans to increase the nuclear capability beyond this point. 
The completion of the Temelin plant has been dogged by delays and cost 
overruns due primarily to the decision to replace the original Russian control 
system with one of Western design. 
The safety upgrading programme for Dukovany and Temelin is funded entirely 
by the owners, the state power company CEZ, and there seems little 
requirement for additional EU support. No proposals for PHARE funding are 
planned for the near future, partly based on the rather poor record of slowness 
and bureaucracy of the programme in the past. The Regulatory Authority 
appears to be well organised and competent, and there are no outstanding 
problems and, apart from their request for the EU to define "Western Standards", 
there seems to be no need for specific EU action. 
One area where there is a cause for concern, however, is in the clean up of 
Uranium mining activities. An environmental action programme is called for and, 
as with all problems of this kind, the costs are potentially very large. 
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8. Hungary 
Of all the Eastern European countries, the Panel believes that Hungary is the 
closest to "Western Standards" and practices. It operates 4 WER 440/213 
reactors at the Paks site. These plant have been subject to major upgrading 
programmes and in many ways provide a "model" as to what can be achieved in 
given financial and time constraints for an operating plant. This includes the 
upgrading of safety systems, operational procedures and interactions with the 
regulatory authorities. The contribution of Nuclear is at present about 40% of 
electricity production and the longer term energy strategy is to keep it at about 
that level. Since the ground rules for new capacity is on a least cost basis, any 
new plant will have to be competitive. The age of the present plant means that 
replacement will be due on about a 1  0 year time frame. 
Spent fuel storage and ultimate disposal is seen by them as a key issue. 
Whether fuel is eventually sent back to Russia for reprocessing, or is retained 
and eventually disposed of, they still have to make provision for the ultimate safe 
handling of all this radioactive material. This is an area for possible EU 
involvement in the R&D required to establish a technically sound ultimate 
disposal scheme. 
Arguably the potentially most useful area for future collaboration is in research, 
where they have experience and skills on a par with the EU. 
In other fields, previous experience with PHARE projects has not been very 
encouraging; and Hungarian officials do not expect large contributions in the 
future. 
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9. Lithuania 
Lithuania is unique amongst the Eastern European countries with nuclear power 
in that it was a full member of the Soviet Union, and had two large RBMK Plant 
constructed on its territory. These two reactors at lgnalina can provide up to 
-80% of the countries electricity needs and have been the source of lucrative 
exports of energy. These reactors are of later generation design and have 
received a good deal of upgrading, primarily through EBRD-NSA and PHARE 
funding and a local safety improvement programme. Sweden has a very strong 
regional interest and commensurately large bi-lateral programme. One of the 
conditions of the NSA agreement provides that the reactors should not be 
operated beyond the time at which an ageing phenomenon known as gap 
closure (i.e. the closure of the gap between the coolant tubes and the graphite 
blocks) requires retubing of the reactor core. Retubing of Units 1 and 2 is not 
allowed under the terms of the NSA Agreement. In 1994, when the agreement 
was concluded, these requirements were expected to occur in the range 
1999-2002 for Unit 1 and in the range 2005-2007 for Unit 2. Current indications 
are that this requirement will indeed occur before 2002 for unit 1. 
Lithuania would like to keep Unit 1 running as long as possible and might 
consider retubing. This is against both the spirit and the letter of the NSA 
agreement and poses a severe test for both the veracity of the Lithuanian 
government and the resolve of the funding agencies. In this situation, the Panel 
offers the following findings and comments to the Commission, recognising the 
multi-dimensionality of the safety, economic, social and political (accession) 
issues. 
In high level political discussions, it must be made clear to the Lithuanian 
authorities that the EU considers the response of Lithuania to its previous 
commitment as a test of its international credibility. The Panel believes therefore 
that the objective and the conditionality of the NSA agreement should be 
respected, all the more as 
•  there are sound technical reasons for not supporting the extended 
operation of this plant, risk increasing with age 
•  this objective has been endorsed by the EU in the Agenda 2000 and in the 
Accession Partnership. 
This leads to the following recommendations: 
•  It would be imperative that the international community press for the 
closure of Unit 1 as soon as the gap closure condition is reached, which 
should be before 2002, and for the closure of Unit 2 about 5 years later. In 
any case, there should be no concession on the non-retubing requirement. 
•  Establishment of an energy plan for the country, based on these closure 
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dates for both Units. 
•  The upgrading programme being applied to Unit 2, specifically to include 
the timely implementation of a second shutdown system, should be 
adequate for it to continue to operate for some time. 
Overall, the Panel believes that the technical specialists and the regulatory 
authorities in  Lithuania have made great progress and are deserving continued 
support. 
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10. Romania 
Romania is a poor country and the public finance crisis is severe. The situation 
regarding nuclear power is different from Bulgaria in that they operate the 
Canadian designed CANDU type of reactor. So far as reactor safety is 
concerned, the main worry is the withdrawal of Canadian assistance. This is 
already at a very low level and the situation could become critical. The EU 
should monitor the situation closely, with a view to stepping in if the need arises. 
Sounding out of the Canadians intentions would be beneficial. 
Because the reactors are of a very different type to those operated elsewhere in 
Europe, an important early pre-emptive move would be for the Commission to 
identify a small team of specialists who still have the expertise from earlier 
development of this technology in Europe who can provide the necessary 
technical advice. 
For reactors of this type, there is always the threat of their use for producing 
weapons materials. Whilst there is presently no suggestion that this is part of the 
Romanians planning, it means that long term safeguarding of the plant is an 
important consideration. Heavy water production should also be monitored. 
There is also a problem with Uranium mine recuperation which is likely to require 
attention just like Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. No studies are available as 
yet so we do not know the extent of the problem. 
27 
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11. Slovakia 
Without entering into the recent controversy over the start-up of the Mochovce 
power plant, the Panel notes that the Slovak authorities have conducted an 
important programme of upgrading of their WER reactors both at Bohunice V1 
(2 WER 230) 
and V2 (2 WER 213) and at Mochovce (2 WER 213). The Slovak system is 
characterised by a strong Nuclear Regulatory Authority relying on well structured 
legislation for the control of nuclear power. Currently nuclear contributes about 
38% of the total electricity generating capacity. The bringing onto stream of the 
Mochovce units should allow the closure of the Bohunice V1  thereby maintaining 
approximately a 1/3 contribution from nuclear to the energy mix. The Bohunice 
V2 units have undergone several upgrading and enhancement activities; once 
the upgrading of the V1  units which is currently being implemented is completed, 
a long term programme concentrating on the period 2004 - 2010 for the V2 units 
will be undertaken. Once achieved, these, together with the upgraded Mochovce 
units, would meet all of the requirements of Western Practices. 
The issue of spent fuel also applies here, but the plan for storage at the power 
station sites until disposal, as well as the generation of disposal and 
decommissioning funds through a surcharge of 30% on the electricity price, are 
expected to provide a sound longer term plan. 
Slovakia has to face the immediate requirement to decommission its A 1 reactor 
(gas-cooled, heavy water moderated) which stopped operation in 1977. 
However, its fuel has already been shipped back to Russia and active planning 
for the decommissioning is already underway. 
The main recommendations for the future are : 
•  to co-operate with the regulatory authorities to ensure that a strong position 
is maintained and to facilitate their participation in the activities of their EU 
counterparts. 
•  to provide whatever assistance is appropriate to ensure the safe operation 
of the Mochovce Units as well as the early completion of upgrading the 
Bohunice V2 units 
•  to continue to press for the closure of Bohunice V1  units, even if this should 
occur before the end of their planned lifetimes 
•  to promote regional co-operation between operators of WER 213 reactors, 
as the Bohunice, Mochovce, Dukovany and Paks Units are all similar. 
2? 
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12. Slovenia 
Slovenia operates a pressurised water reactor of Western design at Krsko. It is a 
US built plant and therefore well known and in the main is operated to Western 
standards. The only possible problem of which the Panel is aware is a concern 
over the seismic capability of the plant. It would be prudent to establish the 
nature of the concern and of the need for any future actions. 
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3.1. -Technical 
The Panel has spent considerable time discussing with many parties the lessons, 
which may be drawn from the previous programmes of assistance under TACIS 
and PHARE. This has lead to many recommendations and much advice which we 
would wish to draw to the attention of the Commission. Most of this is referred too 
in situ in the paper where its relevance to either the technical or national context 
can be seen. Here we pull out the main recommendations to give a more 
coherent overview of our findings. 
1  . It is now time to move the emphasis of the interaction with the "beneficiary" 
countries from one of assistance to technical collaboration. 
2. The focus of the future programme should shift from reactor concentrating on 
reactor safety improvement to other aspects of nuclear safety, specifically, 
radioactive waste management, the fuel cycle, research reactors, safeguards and 
safety research. 
3. The principal vehicle for ensuring reactor safety is through continued and in 
some cases increased support for the National Regulatory bodies. 
4. For the Applicant countries there is a need to provide a definition of "Western 
Standards". The Panel recommends that the Applicant countries are advised to 
choose from the Member States those regulatory practices which most closely 
meet their needs. 
5. The Panel were impressed by the immediacy and need for action concerning 
the Shelter project at Chernobyl. We recommend that the EU and its industry be 
more present in the International Shelter Project. 
6.  In the same vein as the Shelter project in Ukraine, we believe that the focus in 
Russia should swing towards the stabilisation of the radioactive wastes, primarily 
in the North West. The Panel should warn, however, that there must be realism in 
what it can achieve, given the resources needed and available. The Panel also 
recommends the development of support for the radioactive waste handling and 
storage facilities east of the Urals, specifically at Mayak. 
7. Also applying primarily, but not exclusively to Russia, is the need to enhance 
support for the development of a sufficient expertise in Safeguards. including 
training programmes and help towards developing an indigenous instrumentation 
and measurement capability. Part of this support should go towards a training 
centre East of the Urals. 
8.  It is recommended that research reactors are specifically included in the topics 
for which assistance can be sought, and then invite countries to make proposals. 
9. The Panel believe that it would a very cost effective means of achieving the 
objectives of ensuring continuing nuclear safety and the eventual return to self 
help by increasing support to research collaboration between the East and EU 
member states. 
11 
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10. If we are to encourage countries to close older plant early, then support for the 
initial decommissioning phases is justifiable. 
3.2 The means required for implementation of the strategy : a 
casted scenario 
In order to implement the long term strategy which it recommends, the Panel has 
considered the issue of its adequate funding. It is obvious that the PHARE and 
TACIS programmes or their successors would require many billions of ECU's (see 
section 2.1.3) if all of the safety requirements identified by various Expert Groups 
had to be financed entirely through this sole channel. This, however is not the 
case as other funding sources have to be taken into consideration, most notably 
the countries themselves. In particular, the Panel noted during its discussions in 
the countries, that most of the Applicant Countries were relying on their own 
funding for the safety upgrading of their NPP's. This is one of the reasons why the 
Panel is advocating a transition from assistance to collaboration in the future 
dealings with these countries. Furthermore, financial support should be directed 
preferentially to those areas where funding cannot be supplied by sales revenues 
from electricity and particularly where it comes from public expenditure. This 
means primarily site decontamination, care of research reactors, safeguards and, 
most importantly regulatory activities. The Panel, therefore is proposing the 
following scheme which implies an increase of PHARE and TACIS funding, not on 
a dramatic scale, but which above all suggests a redeployment of funds on 
different objectives which are outlined in more detail in our recommendations. 
The costed scenario is based on the following structure: 
1. Nuclear Power Plant Safety, divided into: 
1.1. On-site assistance: for the Panel, this item relates to 
"soft" activities and should concentrate in the future on 
management measures e.g. optimisation of maintenance, 
tendering, two-way exchange of staff. 
1.2. Design safety: Beyond studies, this involves supply 
some of hardware; joint ventures between Eastern and 
Western suppliers should be encouraged 
1.3. Risk Evaluation and Reduction: the support in this area 
should consist essentially of methodology, data, evaluation. 
1.4. Replacement Power: This is not a technical item: it 
corresponds to the financial support that the EU might 
provide to compensate for the economic losses (in terms of 
power or fuel imports) arising from lack of electricity 
production during safety upgradings of NPP's 
2. Support to Regulatory Authorities 
3. Fuel Cycle and Radioactive Waste 
4. Environmental decontamination 
5. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
6. Research Reactors: This item covers both safe operation and safe 
closure, the latter appearing as the most urgent need. 
7. Safeguards 
8. Fund for fast response: a limited fund should be created to allow an 
immediate response to unexpected situations. 
9. Management: the Panel does not intend to suggest figures for this 
item which is of the sole responsibility of the Commission but wishes to 
insist on the fact that adequate financial means must be devoted to 
management. Without such provision, the other amounts are to be 
J2 
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wasted. 
It should be noted that this structure does no longer foresee the financing of 
training centres and simulators, or off-site preparedness and crises centres; the 
Panel feels that assistance for such activities should be completed by the year 
2000 and efforts concentrated elsewhere. 
The Panel's report is constantly underlining the differences in approaches to be 
used for Applicant Countries on one side and for New Independent States on the 
other side. These differences are reflected in the costed scenario; the Panel 
proposes two different sets of figures; these figures correspond to proposed 
annual expenditures expressed in millions EURO during a 5 year period i.e. for 
the period 2000-2004. Suggesting figures beyond such a time frame would not be 
realistic and a system of sliding multi-annual financial programming with a 
mid-term review in 2002 for the period 2002-2006 would be more appropriate. 
The costed scenario is reproduced in the table hereunder. 
I 
Item  I Credits in MEURO/year 
j Applicant Countries ~ 
lr1_._N_u_c_le_a_r_p_o_w_e_r_p_la_n_t_sa_~_e_ty-----r---------------~ 
11 .1  On site assistance  11  re-
~~  1-.-2-D_e_s_ig_n_s_a_fu-~--(in_c_l_h_a_rd_w_a_re-)---~,-1-------------~ 
11 .3 Risk evaluation and reduction  I  2  r 
~~1-.-4-R_e_p-la_c_e_m_e_n_t_p_ow---er---------~r-p.-m-.-----------~p.m. 
j2. Support to regulatory authorities  17  r:--
~~3-._F_u_e_l-cy-c-le--a-nd--ra-d-io_a_c-ti-ve  __  w_a_s-te-rj-N-IL-------------~ 
14. Environmental decontamination  120  ~ 
,~5-._D_e_c_o_m_m_i_s-si_o_n·-,n-g------------r,-2-------------r 
~~-~ch  reactors  js  [NIL" 
17. Safeg~·~rds  12  r 
js.  Fund-f~r fast response  11  r-
r,9-._M_a_n_a_g_e_m_e_n_t ______________  .r,-p.-m-.-----------,p.m. 
I  TOTAL  142  184 
This table calls for the following comments: 
•  The ratio of 2 to 1 between proposed overall funding for NIS and Applicant 
Countries does not reflect political priorities. Nuclear safe~  in Applicant 
Countries is of paramount importance but measures to ensure it are 
essentially financed by the Applicant Countries themselves, while for the NIS 
help towards self-help must be maintained  . 
•  the difference between figures for On-Site Assistance reflect the greater 
need in this field in Russia and Ukraine; On-Site Assistance in Applicant 
Countries should be on an ~  basis 
•  for Design Safety, the large amount for NIS corresponds to the supply of 
hardware which should serve as demonstration in a particular plant. The 
selection of hardware projects should be based on the prospect to see the 
beneficiary country applying this demonstration to other plants. 
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•  Credits for Replacement Power, if the principle of such financial intervention 
were retained, should be decided according to the relevant needs  . 
•  Support to Regulatory Authorities in both Applicant Countries and NIS 
should concentrate on the provision of specialised expertise, training, 
support to participation of Eastern regulators in visits to, and meetings in, the 
EU 
•  For Fuel Cycle and Radioactive Waste, the Applicant Countries can finance 
their own relevant activities; for the NIS, the 12 MEURO per year are equally 
divided in 6 MEURO/year for the EU support to a N.W. Russia integrated 
project, and 6 MEURO/year for the EU support to remedying the most 
urgent problems around the MAYAK site, including the construction of 
storage pools  . 
•  For Environmental Decontamination, the sum under NIS is only for the 
Chernobyl Shelter Fund (in view of the priority of this project, the Panel 
considers a sum over 5 years, which clearly exceeds the current EC 
commitment; this should be reflected in increased industrial participation). 
The sum under Applicant Countries- 20 MEURO/year- should cover the 
nuclear specific aspects of the environmental restoration of Uranium mines 
in Estonia, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria; the more general 
environmental aspects, as for other areas of mining activities, should be 
covered by funds intended to promote environmental restoration in general. 
•  For Decommissioning, the amounts foreseen are essentially for transfer of 
methodology and expert assistance  . 
•  For Research Reactors, the priority should clearly be given to Applicant 
Countries. With 6 MEURO/year over 5 years, beyond some very limited 
support to maintain safe operation, the safe closure of 3 research reactors 
could be achieved. 
•  For Safeguards, the difference between the two figures is related to the 
greater requirement in Russia due to the amount of fissile material spread 
over its territory; the training centre East of the Urals is important in this 
respect and links with the initiative proposed around MAYAK. 
•  For the Fast Response Fund, the provision of 1 MEURO per year would 
cover the most urgent needs. 
•  It should be noted that possible contributions to the overall issue of nuclear 
safety in the East through EURATOM loans has not been taken into 
consideration by the Panel. This could complement the proposed strategy 
but the criteria for financing are quite different. 
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4 - Conclusions 
In the brief period which has been available for it to carry out its work, the Panel 
has attempted to deliver an independent technical appreciation of the current 
situation regarding Nuclear Safety in the East and of the actions required of the 
European Union in this respect. From its findings, the Panel has created a series 
of recommendations for future action which it submits for consideration to the 
Member of the Commission who took the initiative in setting it up. 
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Terms of Reference of the Panel 
Nuclear Safety in Central and Eastern Europe and in the CIS: recommendations of a 
strategy for future actions of the European Commission. 
Background and Objective 
Nuclear safety, being one of the fundamental criteria in the enlargement process, 
is a priority of the Agenda 2000, and requires a clear definition of the actions to be 
implemented within the Agenda 2000. Furthermore, safety of nuclear installations 
located within the Commonwealth of Independent States, remains a 
preoccupation for political circles and public opinion inside the EU and the 
response of the Commission to such preoccupations has to be better perceived. 
The actions led by the Commission through the PHARE and TACIS programmes 
are suffering from a lack of visibility and are subject to criticisms related to a lack 
of focus. 
These considerations lead to the need for the Commission to review and possibly 
update its strategy in the nuclear safety sector. This review should be backed by 
the work of a panel of high level advisors [PHLA], which should provide 
independent technical advice on the orientation and implementation for the 
coming years of the PHARE and TACIS programmes and their successors. 
The PHLA should assist the Commission in responding to two basic questions : 
•  how can the PHARE programme be best adapted and implemented to 
promote the nuclear safety aspects of Agenda 2000 ? 
•  how can the Commission ensure a stronger focusing of the TACIS 
programme, reinforce its visibility and improve the coherence between the 
various donors and the beneficiaries in defining and implementing this 
programme taking into account the work of NUSAC ? 
Method of Work 
In carrying out its task, Members of the PHLA should take into account the 
previous work performed in the framework of the TACIS and PHARE 
programmes, notably the Nuclear Safety Assessment Study performed by Messrs 
Hayns, Hicken and Tanguy in 1996. 
In addition to priority discussions with Commission Services, the Panel should 
interview various actors on the scene of Nuclear Safety such as the TPEG, the 
RAMG, the TSOG, bilateral donors and multilateral organisations. 
Task Description 
The Panel should organise itself and its work in order to meet the general 
objective described above. Without pre-judging the outcome of the discussion on 
this issue, the following tasks can already be outlined: 
a) update of the analysis of the improvement (or degradation), since the last 
assessment performed in 1996, in the nuclear safety situation in the countries 
benefiting from the PHARE and TACIS programmes. 
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b) deriving from this analysis, identification of critical areas which might require 
intervention beyond the scope of current programmes (e.g. intervention in areas 
other than nuclear power plants' safety). 
c) survey of cost estimates to improve the nuclear safety situation to a level which 
corresponds to the nuclear safety culture as established in the Western World. 
d) analysis of the need to reconsider the form of Western assistance in some 
areas, taking into consideration the relevant countries' indigenous efforts. 
e) analysis of the coherence between EU assistance programmes and other 
assistance programmes, possible need for improved co-ordination. 
f) on the basis of a) to e), definition of preferred avenues for the future EC 
contribution to the development of long term solutions to nuclear safety problems 
in the countries under consideration. 
When developing such definitions, the following factors should, among others, be 
taken into consideration : 
•  how far should the EC contribution be demand-driven and how far should it 
take into account EC internal considerations (e.g. geographical proximity of 
EU borders), how far should the concept of conditionality be introduced in 
the process ? 
•  how to develop solutions which are consistent with a long-term energy policy 
of the countries in question ? 
•  how to transform pure assistance into co-operation involving the relevant 
actors in both donors and beneficiaries' countries ? (duly taking into account 
ongoing co-operation programmes in relevant Commission services) ? 
g) following the definition of preferred avenues, recommendation for priorities in 
EC future actions taking into account : 
•  a realistic framework for EC financial assistance 
•  the need for improving the visibility of assistance programmes (e.g. through 
the concentration on fewer, larger projects yielding results which are 
consistent with the agreed strategy). 
•  specific considerations related to the accession of Central and Eastern 
European Countries. 
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